For exposures X like obesity, no precise and unambiguous definition exists for the hypothetical intervention do(X = x0). This has raised concerns about the relevance of causal effects estimated from observational studies for such exposures. Under the framework of structural causal models, we study how the effect of do(X = x0) relates to the effect of interventions on causes of X. We show that for interventions focusing on causes of X that affect the outcome through X only, the effect of do(X = x0) equals the effect of the considered intervention. On the other hand, for interventions on causes W of X that affect the outcome not only through X, we show that the effect of do(X = x0) only partly captures the effect of the intervention. In particular, under simple causal models (e.g., linear models with no interaction), the effect of do(X = x0) can be seen as an indirect effect of the intervention on W .
Introduction
Because most epidemiological results are derived from observational data, their causal interpretation has always been at the center of concern 1 . Causal inference theory, which has attracted a lot of interest in the last few decades, has proved useful to formally describe conditions ensuring the causal validity of results derived from observational data 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 . For example, a number of sets of sufficient conditions has been established for the identifiability of causal effects in the presence of confounding or non-random selection.
Under the so-called Structural Causal Models 3, 6 (SCMs), and further assuming that the structure of the underlying Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)
is known, a key condition for the identifiability of the causal effect is exchangeability, or ignorability 3, 6, 7 . In particular, exchangeability has been shown to hold conditionally on any set of variables satisfying the back-door criterion 3, 6 . Then, a variety of statistical approaches have been proposed for the estimation of causal effects under increasingly complex settings including time-varying confounding, failure time data, etc. Among other approaches, we shall mention the parametric g-formula, inverse probability weighting approaches, g-estimation and doubly robust procedures 3, 7, 8 .
Even if their use has been controversial 9 , counterfactual variables, or potential outcomes, are key to most causal inference theories commonly considered nowadays, in epidemiology, social science, statistics and computer science. The do-calculus that accompanies SCMs allows precise definitions of these variables and their joint distribution 3, 6 . Here, we will use the notation Y (X=x0) to denote the counterfactual variable representing the outcome that would have been observed in the counterfactual world Ω (X=x0) that would have followed the hypothetical intervention do(X = x 0 ), where X is the exposure of interest and x 0 is any potential value for this exposure 3 . For simplicity, we will focus on binary outcomes, and we let IP(Y = 1|do(X = x 0 ) = 1) = IP(Y (X=x0) = 1) denote the probability of observing the outcome in this counterfactual world.
For some exposures, the lack of a precise and unambiguous definition for the intervention do(X = x 0 ) has raised some concerns in the literature 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 . For example, consider the case where X stands for a binary variable indicating obesity status at 20 years of age. In a population of lean teenagers, or even newborns, the hypothetical intervention do(X = x 0 ), for x 0 = 0 (or x 0 = 1), could then correspond to a typically adaptive and dynamic intervention that would ensure that individuals stay lean (or get obese) by the age of 20. However, these interventions are not well-defined, in the sense that different "versions" may lead to the same obesity value x 0 at 20 years-old. For instance, in the "stay lean" arm (do(X = 0)), individuals may be asked to do 45 minutes of physical exercise a day, or 72 minutes of physical exercise a day. They could also be asked to adhere to a healthy diet, etc. In addition, some of the versions ensuring that X = 0 at 20 years old may be impossible to apply in practice, such as those involving genetic factors.
More generally, this situation of a treatment with different versions, or compound treatment, violates the "no-multiple-versions-of-treatment assumption", which is part of the "Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption"
(SUTVA) 16, 20 . This has led to some debate around the relevance, for public health matters, of the causal effects estimated from observational studies in such cases. Interestingly, most arguments have been based by considering the situation where "treatment precedes versions of that treatment", while situations where "versions precede treatment" were only quickly mentioned, if at all 11, 12, 16 . Here, we consider the situations where versions precede treatment, in which case these versions can be seen as particular levels for the causes of X. Then, focusing on situations where direct interventions on X are impractical, we inspect how the effect of the hypothetical intervention do(X = x 0 ) relates to the effects of interventions on causes of X. We show that the effect of the hypothetical intervention do(X = x 0 ) equals the effect of particular interventions on causes of X that are causes of Y through X only, as expected. However, for causes W that influence Y not only through X, the causal effect of X differs from the causal effect of interventions on W . For example, in the particular case of obesity and cancer occurence, the effect of do(X = x 0 ) is different from the effects of interventions on diet or physical activity, except for cancers whose risk is not directly associated with diet and/or physical activity.
To make our illustrative example even more concrete, we assume throughout that we intend to estimate the causal effect of obesity at 20 years of age on the occurence of cancer by the age of 50. A typical prospective cohort study would sample individuals who are cancer-free at the age of 20, record information regarding their obesity status and other variables (potential confounders, etc.) at inclusion, follow these individuals over the age interval 20-50 and finally record cancer occurence by the age of 50. Denote by X ∈ {0, 1} and Y ∈ {0, 1} the binary variables representing obesity at 20
and cancer occurence between 20 and 50. For simplicity, we further assume the absence of competing events and censoring.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Even if this is highly unlikely in our illustrative example, we start by considering the unconfounded setting where all causes of X are causes of Y through X only. Then, in Section 3, we consider a more realistic setting where confounders are present.
We shall stress that this second setting is still an over-simplified version of the causal model in our illustrative example (see the Discussion). Yet, we believe it is instructive to describe the relationship between the intervention do(X = x 0 ) and its multiple versions. Under both settings, we consider the situation where some causes are modifiable, while others are not. Section 4 presents some concluding remarks and discussion. Proofs of our main results are presented in the Appendix.
The unconfounded case
Because exposure X is not randomized in our prospective cohort study, identifiability of the causal effect of X on Y is generally not guaranteed. A particular situation when this causal effect is identifiable is when all causes of X, denoted by U in this simple case, are causes of Y through X only. Even
where V and ϑ correspond to modifiable and non-modifiable causes of X, respectively Figure 1 : DAGs and associated structural equations in the unconfounded case. Non-circled variables (U , ξ, ϑ and V ) correspond to exogeneous variables 6 , which are generally not reported in the DAG. We use dashed-arrows to connect any such exogeneous variable to any other variable.
if this absence of confounders is highly unlikely in our illustrative example, it is instructive to consider this simple situation as a starting point. The more general situation where confounding is present is deferred to Section 3.
Preliminary derivations
Consider that the data available in our cohort study are generated by a causal model with associated DAG and structural equations as presented in Figure   1a . Variables ξ and U represent all causes of Y and X, respectively, and are assumed to be independent to each other. Both ξ and U may include purely random components. Given the structural equations attached to this simple causal model, we have {X = x} ⇒ {Y = Y (x) }, so that consistency holds.
Moreover, under this causal model, the ignorability condition
Then, whenever the positivity condition further holds (0 < IP(X = 1) < 1),
we have
and the causal effect of X on Y is identifiable. But, when direct interventions on X are impractical, and only interventions on the causes of X are practical, a natural question is the meaning of the hypothetical intervention do(X = x).
Consider the structural equation pertaining to exposure, X = f X (U ), and set
In this simple case, all interventions do(U = u x0 ) on the causes of X which would yield X = x 0 share the same effect on Y : versions are irrelevant 11, 16 , and the causal effect IP(Y = 1|do(X = x 0 )) estimated on the cohort is an estimate of this shared effect.
Distinguishing modifiable and non-modifiable causes
To gain insight from a practical standpoint, the previous analysis can be slightly refined by decomposing causes of X as U = (V, ϑ) where V and ϑ correspond to sets of modifiable and non-modifiable causes of X, respectively.
See X|ϑ (x; ν) = {v : f X (v, ν) = x}. First assume that this set is non-empty for any x ∈ {0, 1} and ν ∈ V: in other words, first assume that, for any x ∈ {0, 1}, and for any value ν for the non-modifiable factors ϑ, there exists some value v of the modifiable factors
X|ϑ (x 0 ; ν 0 ). Denote by do(V = v x0 (ϑ)) any intervention which sets, for all individuals in the population, the value of V according to the value ν 0 of ϑ, in such a way that for any individual with ϑ = ν 0 ,
X|ϑ (x 0 ; ν 0 ). Then, we have IP(Y = 1|do(V = v x0 (ϑ))) = IP(Y = 1|do(X = x 0 )). In other words, versions are again irrelevant and any such intervention has the same effect
Of course, unless there exists at least one value v 1 ∈ ∩ ν∈V {f −1
X|ϑ (x 0 ; ν)}, only a dynamic, i.e. individual-specific, treatment can be adopted to attain this effect. For instance, consider the "stay lean" arm of the clinical trial mentioned in the Introduction. Because individuals may be more or less genetically predisposed to obesity, some individuals will have to make little effort to stay lean by the age of 20, while others will have to adopt a drastic diet and/or have intense physical activity, etc. We may stress that this heterogeneity among individuals is at the core of personalized (preventive) medicine and need to be acknowledged, rather than discarded, in causal inference. Similarly, our cohort reflects this heterogeneity: individuals sharing the same obesity status {X = x 0 }, for x 0 ∈ {0, 1}, can differ regarding V and
X|ϑ (x 0 ; ν) = ∅}. The lean and obese groups in our cohort are sampled from Then, the effect of the intervention do(X = x 0 ) can again be interpreted as the effect of any intervention on the causes of X ensuring X = x 0 .
If, for some x, there exist some values ν 1 ∈ V of the non-modifiable variables ϑ such that the set f
−1
X|ϑ (x; ν 1 ) is empty, the intervention do(X = x) is purely theoretical for individuals such that ϑ = ν 1 since no practical intervention could yield X = x for them. However, under the assumptions of SCMs, and if the DAG of Figure 1b But, again, a natural question is how the hypothetical intervention do(X = x) does relate to interventions on causes of X. Neglecting for now issues related to the possibility to apply these interventions in practice, these interventions can concern either (i) U only, (ii) W only, or (iii) both U and W .
First consider interventions on U only and set, for any x ∈ {0, 1} and
(b) Distinguishing modifiable and nonmodifiable causes of X in the presence of confounding Figure 2 : Causal models in the presence of confounders.
X|W (x 0 ; w 0 ) for individuals belonging to stratum W = w 0 . Then, assume that f X|U (x; u) is non-empty for every (x, u) ∈ {0, 1} × U, and for any u 0 ∈ U, denote by w x0 (u 0 ) one given element of f −1 X|U (x 0 ; u 0 ). Given this particular collection of values (w x0 (u)) u∈U , denote by do(W = w x0 (U )) the intervention which sets W to w x0 (u 0 ) for individuals in stratum U = u 0 , for all u 0 ∈ U. Arguing as before, it comes that IP(Y = 1|do(W = w x0 (U ))) = IP(Y = 1|do(X = x 0 , W = w x0 (U ))), which generally differs from IP(Y = 1|do(X = x 0 )). The intervention do(W = w x0 (U )) does entail X = x 0 for all individuals, but because W has an effect on Y not only through X, the effect of do(W = w x0 (U )) is not entirely captured by that of do(X = x 0 ). Actually, X can be seen as a mediator in the W − Y relationship, and, under simple models, in particular in the absence of interaction between X and W , the effect of do(X = x 0 ) is actually related to the indirect effect of the intervention do(W = w x0 (U )), through X|U (x; u) is empty for some (x, u) ∈ {0, 1}×U, then no intervention on W only can ensure X = x for individuals in stratum U = u. Similarly,
X|W (x; w) is empty for some pair (x, w), then no intervention on U only can ensure X = x for individuals in stratum W = w. Then, consider interventions on both W and U , and set f −1 X (x 0 )) and only partly capture the effect of interventions on X. X|ϑ,Z (x 0 ; ν, z) = {(v, w) : f X (v, ν, w, z) = x 0 } is non-empty, and denote by (v x0 (ν, z), w x0 (ν, z)) one given element in this set. Then denote by
Distinguishing modifiable and non-modifiables causes
and W to w x0 (ν 0 , z 0 ) for any individuals in stratum {ϑ = ν 0 } ∩ {Z = z 0 }, for all ν 0 , z 0 . Arguing as before, it can be shown that IP(Y = 1|do(V = v x0 (ϑ, Z), W = w x0 (ϑ, Z))) = IP(Y = 1|do(X = x 0 , W = w x0 (ϑ, Z))). This quantity generally differs from IP(Y = 1|do(X = x 0 ) and the reason again is that the intervention do(V = v x0 (ϑ, Z), W = w x0 (ϑ, Z)) not only ensures that X = x 0 , but it also has a direct effect on Y through the intervention on W .
Conclusion-Discussion
In this article, we showed how the hypothetical intervention do(X = x 0 ), when impossible to apply in practice, relates to interventions on causes of X. There are a number of subtleties that we neglected for the sake of simplicity. First, a clinical trial whose objective is to prevent obesity by the age of 20 would typically not only be dynamic, but also adaptive, i.e. the intervention is not only subject-specific, but it is also time-dependent. A good example is the Feeding Dynamic Intervention, to prevent childhood years of age, they also typically differ with respect to their histories regarding obesity, physical activity and dietary habits. This can lead to biases if these histories are not appropriately accounted for in the analysis 21 . Second, selection bias may also be at play in our cohort study since only individuals who are cancer-free at 20 can be included. This selection bias will be more severe if cancer risk before 20 years old is associated to levels of obesity, physical activity and dietary habits over the age interval [0, 19] . This selection bias due to prevalent exposure and depletion of susceptibles has been put forward as one of the reasons explaining the discrepancies between results obtained through observational and interventional data when studying the association between hormone replacement therapy and coronary heart disease for instance 22 .
A Proof in the unconfounded case
Under the model depicted in Figure 1a , we have
B Proof in the confounded case B.1 Interventions of type (i)
X|W (x 0 ; w 0 ) is non-empty for any x 0 , w 0 . Then, under the model depicted in Figure 2a , we have, for any u x0 (w 0 ) ∈ f
where the last equality follows from rule 2 of the do-calculus 3 .
Moreover,
B.2 Interventions of type (ii)
Assume that f 
B.3 Relationship with indirect effects
Denote by (w 1 (u 0 ), w 0 (u 0 )) u0∈U two given collection of values such that 
